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Sports Law Arbitration by CAS: is it
the Same as International

Arbitration?
Richard H. McLaren*
By the early 1980s, a pressing need had emerged to find an ultimate,
authoritative and neutral solution to judicial disputes among athletes,
international and national sports federations, national Olympic committees,
and Olympic and other games organizers. The Olympic Movement decided
to create a final and binding court of arbitration for all sports-related
disputes, including doping cases.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") was established April 6,
1983 at an International Olympic Committee ("IOC") session in New Delhi,'
and since that time has dealt with sports-specific disputes of a private nature.
The court provides a forum for the world's athletes and sports federations to
resolve their disputes through a single independent and accomplished sports
adjudication body. The court has developed the ability to apply consistently
the rules of different sports organizations and the world-wide rules of the
Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code.2 The CAS is in the course of
developing universal principles that will some day be widely recognized as
the lex sportiva?

* Professor Richard H. McLaren, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London,
Canada. Member of the Court of Arbitration for Sport since 1994, and the Ad Hoc Division of CAS
at the Winter Games in Nagano, 1998 and the Summer Games in Sydney, 2000. I would like to
acknowledge the contribution and assistance of my researcher Jim Bunting of the Western Law
Class of 2002. I am indebted to him for his excellent work with me on this article. The contents of
this paper were delivered at the International Law Weekend, January 26 & 27, 2001, at the
Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, California, sponsored by the American Branch of the
International Law Association.
1. See Matthieu Reeb, Digest of CAS awards 1986-1998, (Staempfil Eds Berne (1998) XXIIIXXXI); Hon. Justice Kavanagh, The Doping Cases and the Need for the International Court of
Arbitrationfor Sport, 22 UN SWT 721 (1992).
2. Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code 1999 and Explanatory Memorandum Concerning
the
Application of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code, available at http://www.olympic.org.
3. A term coined by the Acting General Secretary of CAS, Matthieu Reeb, at the time of
publishing of the first digest of CAS decisions stretching over the period from 1983-1998.

Despite the growth and success of the CAS, some International
Federations ("IFs") 4 have not agreed to use it for dispute settlement. The
International Amateur Athletic Federation ("IAAF"), at its Athens Congress
in 1982, created what it termed the "Arbitration Panel," intended to be the
final and binding internal sports court for disputes in athletics. The IAAF
Arbitration Panel started its jurisprudential activity in 1985, while the CAS
followed suit one year later. By far, the more significant body is the CAS,
which has decided twenty-six Olympic cases since 1996 and more than ten
times that number of cases outside of the Olympic Games. The IAAF, on
the other hand, decided fifteen cases through the end of 1999.' At its
Congress in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada in August 2001, the IAAF passed a
resolution adopting the CAS.6

I. FUNCTION OF CAS
The CAS functions independently from all sports organizations. The
Code of Sports Related Arbitration7 (the "Code") is applied to settle sportsrelated disputes through arbitration. The Code is divided into two parts:
Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes
(S1-S26) and Procedural Rules (R27-69). Rule 58 directs a CAS panel to
decide a dispute "according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law
chosen by the parties." 8 Where the parties make no such choice, the dispute
is resolved "according to the law of the country in which the federation,
association or sports body which has issued the challenged decision is
domiciled." In this manner, the CAS renders decisions on the basis of
applicable regulations in the sport or federation concerned. In so doing, the
CAS develops universal principles of sports law while contributing to the
development of a global system of dispute resolution that is consistent with
the needs of global sports.9
The CAS operates using two different proceedings: (1) ordinary
arbitration proceedings; and (2) appeal arbitration proceedings.
Additionally, an Ad Hoc Division ("AHD") was created by the governing

4. FIFA,IAAF.
5. See Lauri Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases Awards by the !AAF
Arbitration Panel 1985-1999 (Milan: SEP Editrice, 2000) (discussing the work of IAAF Arbitration
Panel with contrasting annotations to the CAS jurisprudence).
6. See http://www.eaa-athletics.ch/iaafOI8Ol.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
7. Code, at http://www.tas-cas.org/englishlcode/fracode.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
8. For an example of such a case, see the doping case of tennis professional Petr Korda, where
the panel applied English law. See ITF v. Korda, TAS 99/A/223 (unpublished).
9. The desire to have one system of rules applicable to all sports is acknowledged as the main
task of the newly established World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA"), to try and harmonize the
doping rules and regulations in different sports, federations and countries. The universal principles
and dispute-specific application that has been developed by the CAS has and will continue to be an
integral part in aiding WADA to achieve its goal.
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body of the CAS, the International Council of Arbitration for Sport
("ICAS"), pursuant to Article S6.8 of the Code. Commencing with the
Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta, the AHD has operated at each of the
summer and winter Olympic Games. The AHD follows the rules set out in
the Code and special additional rules created for the Olympic Games."
The CAS provides a unifying institution that can help ensure fairness
and integrity in sport through sound legal control and the administration of
diverse laws and philosophies. This article intends to highlight international
arbitration law issues that arose in the jurisprudence of the CAS through its
Ad Hoc Division at Sydney. 2 Although these issues arose in a sports related
context, they nonetheless illustrate the universality of many issues present in
international arbitration law.
II. CAS JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW

The CAS has been working toward the development of a worldwide
legal system for sport. The jurisprudence of the pre-games Oceania division
of CAS led to an application to the local court of New South Wales.' 3 The
court decision and the jurisprudence of the AHD reflect the maturing nature
of the CAS and how the issues in sports law parallel those in international
arbitration law. The jurisprudence raised issues: (1) surrounding the seat of
the arbitration; (2) the impact of an award on an affected third party; (3) the
jurisdiction of the panel; (4) the inquisitorial principle in connection with the
conduct of a hearing; (5) the impact of national court decisions on an
international arbitration panel; (6) the relation of CAS decisions to national
law; and (7) questions of judicial interpretation, including burden of proof
and appropriate sanctions. This article turns to each of these topics in order

10. The author was an arbitrator with the AHD at the Nagano Winter Games in 1998 and the
Sydney Summer Games in September 2000. Richard McLaren, A New Order: Athletes' Rights and
the Court of Arbitration at the Olympic Games, Olympica, Volume VII at *3 (1998) (detailing the
author's experience during the Nagano Winter Games); Richard McLaren, The Court of Arbitration
for Sport: an Independent Arena for the World's Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379 (2001)
(detailing the author's experience during the Sydney Games).
11. For a discussion of the operation of the AHD at Sydney, see Michael J. Beloff, QC, The CAS
Ad Hoc Division At The Sydney Olympic Games, 1 INT'L SPORTS L. REv.--(2000), (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 2001).
12. The jurisprudence of CAS at Sydney is published in booklet form. Matthieu Reeb, ed., CAS
Awards-Sydney 2000: The decisions delivered by the ad hoc Division of the Court of Arbitrationfor
Sport during the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, (Lausanne: ICAS, 2000).
13. A state within the Commonwealth of Australia that served as the location of the Summer
Games in September, 2000.

to illustrate the universality of the issues arising in international sports law
arbitration.
A. The Seat of Arbitration

Although R28 of the Code provides for the seat of arbitration to be in
Lausanne, Switzerland, it allows for the hearing to be held elsewhere. CAS
is thus located in Lausanne but has hearing facilities in New York (formerly
Denver), United States of America and provides for an Oceania Registry
located in Sydney, Australia.'
The seat of an arbitral tribunal has two primary impacts. It is used as
the link between the arbitration and a set. of municipal rules governing the
arbitration. It is also used as the national origin of an award for purposes of
legal enforcement when the parties are not compliant.
All disputes submitted to the CAS, whether from the AHD, the
Ordinary, or Appeals Arbitration Divisions of CAS, are governed by the
same municipal law of Switzerland. Therefore, there is a uniform regime in
terms of both applicable rules and municipal rules to the arbitration
proceedings 5 regardless of where the hearing takes place.
The Swiss municipal rules on appeal from a CAS decision are consistent
with the development of international arbitration generally. Chapter 12 of
the PIL Act requires the arbitrators to grant due process (Art. 182 paragraph
3). In the same Chapter, Article 190 sets out the parties' remedies against an
award. 6

The seat of the arbitration in Lausanne is intended to provide a uniform
legal framework for all CAS arbitrations wherever they may hear a dispute.
The choice of Sydney as the place of the Oceania hearings implies that local

14. The United States Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA"), which became the national sport drug
testing agency in the USA, adopted a procedure effective October 1, 2000 requiring the use of North
American-based CAS arbitrators" as the adjudicators of the doping rules in the USA, effective
October 1, 2000. http://www.wada-ama.org; http:www.usantidoping.org.
15. Provided one party is not a Swiss domiciliary, the effect of the seat of arbitration being
Switzerland is to make the Swiss PrivateInternational Law of December 18, 1987 (in force as of
January 1, 1989) apply, in particular Chapter 12 Article 176 and the subsequent PIL Act. Therefore,
the CAS decision is final and binding and shall not be subject to further review or appeal except as
permitted by the PIL or the Swiss Judicial Organization Act. In matters of procedure during the
course of the arbitration hearing, the Code vests the Presidents of the various Divisions with powers
to appoint arbitrators, provide interim relief, and remove arbitrators as permitted by Chapter 12 of
the PIL Act. Therefore, it is unlikely that court assistance form Switzerland will be required during
the arbitral process.
16. Grounds for vacating the award are found when the arbitral tribunal: (1) was not properly
constituted; (2) had no jurisdiction; (3) ruled beyond the claims submitted to it; (4) failed to decide
one of the claims; (5) failed to grant due process; or (6) rendered an award irreconcilable with public
policy. Swiss Federal Tribunal, No. 5P.427/2000 (Dec. 4, 2000). The specific grounds used in the
appeal from the Andreea Raducan AHD decision were based on due process and public policy
concerns. Id.
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courts within the state of New South Wales have jurisdiction over the award
of the arbitrators.
The Oceania division heard a large number of Australian Olympic team
selection cases leading up to the Sydney Games. Perhaps the most
significant jurisprudential issue arising out of the Games came from one of
these decisions, prior to the opening ceremonies and the subsequent decision
of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.' 7
Raguz and Sullivan were two Australian judokas seeking nomination as
the Australian representative for the Olympic Team in the women's under
fifty-two kilogram category. Ms. Raguz was selected by the governing body
for the sport in Australia. Ms. Sullivan unsuccessfully challenged the
selection through the internal appeals procedure provided by the sports
governing body. On appeal to the CAS through the Oceania Registry, Ms.
Sullivan named the sports body and its adjudication panel as the respondent
and Ms. Raguz as an affected third party. The CAS panel of the Oceania
division overturned the decision of the sports governing body adjudication
panel and awarded the selection to Ms. Sullivan. Ms. Raguz sought to
challenge the CAS award by seeking leave to appeal to the courts of New
South Wales ("NSW") on a question of law arising out of the award as a
matter of procedure. The application was then removed to the Court of
Appeal. The NSW Court concluded that an agreement existed between the
parties that excluded any right of appeal. Therefore, pursuant to the
Commercial Arbitration Act,'8 the NSW Court had jurisdiction to review the
decision only if the dispute involved a domestic arbitration agreement
entered into prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings.
Ultimately, the court held that the unqualified choice of Lausanne as the
"seat" of all CAS arbitrations within the scope of the arbitration agreement
indicated that the agreement did provide for arbitration in a country other
than Australia. Accordingly, this was not deemed a domestic arbitration
agreement."
As with all international arbitrations, whether a municipal court has
jurisdiction to review an arbitration award often revolves around the location
of the seat of arbitration. The NSW Court upheld the seat as the legal
connection between the arbitral tribunal, the parties, and the applicable
municipal law. In effect, it held that the parties had excluded a review of the

17. See Raguz v. Sullivan, 2000 NSWCA 290; Reeb, supra note 12, at 185 (offering a
reproduction of the Raguz decision).
. 18. Commercial Arbitration Act, 1984 No. 160, as amended by Act 1990 No. 100, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consolact/ca1984219.txt (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
19. Raguz, 2000 NSWCA 290, at 109.

decision in Australia under its municipal law regime and had acknowledged

Switzerland as the national legal system with jurisdiction in aid or control of
arbitration. °
The NSW decision demonstrates the importance of the CAS in
providing Lausanne, Switzerland as the exclusive seat of arbitration for all
of their proceedings. Such a provision does not, however, detract from the
ability of CAS arbitrators to apply the appropriate law.'
B. Affected Party

The CAS functions outside of all sports organizations in order to settle
through arbitration, sports-related disputes. The Code in S1 provides for
arbitration "only in so far as the statutes or regulations of the said sports
bodies or a specific agreement" establish the CAS jurisdiction. Thus, CAS
arbitration, as with most arbitrations, is founded upon contractual agreement.
This foundation raises an issue regarding the extent to which a party who is
not an applicant or a respondent is affected by an arbitration award. The
effect that an arbitration award has on third parties is a complex issue. It is
clear, however, that arbitration awards can have serious consequences on
parties that are not directly involved in the proceedings. The Code and
Special Rules for the Games provide that the Panel has full control over the
proceedings and can organize the procedure as it deems appropriate. 3

Therefore, in order to address this issue, the CAS developed the practice of
serving notice to interested third parties at the Sydney Games. The Raguz
case, ' the Perez trilogy,25 and the two related Miranda decisions26 illustrate
the extent to which affected parties are bound by a CAS decision.

20. Beloff, supra note 11, at 7 n.17.
21. As mentioned above, R58 directs a CAS panel to decide the dispute "according to the
applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties"; and where the parties make no
such choice then the dispute is resolved "according to the law of the country in which the federation,
association or sports body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled." Code of Sports
Related Arbitration, § R58, availableat http://www.tas-cas.org/english/code/indexR.asp (last visited
Sept. 21, 2001). Therefore, in the Raguz selection arbitration the relevant rules where those of the
Australian Sports Federation as interpreted and applied under Australian law.
22. Id. at 51. Most of the world's sports bodies have included such a statute or regulation into
their rules except for the IAAF and FIFA.
23. Id. at R44.3; Special Rules for the Games, § 15(b), available at http://www.tas
cas.org/english/rules/textes/reg;ementJO.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
24. Raguz, 2000 NSWCA 290.
25. United States Olympic Comm. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division
(O.G. Sydney 2000) 001, award of Sept. 13 ("Perez #1"); Perez v. IOC, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc
Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 005, award of Sept. 19 ("Perez #2"); In re Perez, Arbitration CAS Ad
Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 009, award of Sept. 25, 2000 ("Perez #3").
26. Miranda v. IOC, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 003, award of Sept.
13, 2000 ("Miranda #1"); Miranda v. IOC, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000)
008, award of Sept. 24, 2000 ("Miranda #2").
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In Raguz, when the selection dispute proceeded to CAS Oceania via the
application of Ms. Sullivan, Ms. Raguz was named as an affected party. In
the subsequent appeal, the NSW Court held that Ms. Raguz had been a party
affected by the interlocking contractual agreements that existed between the
athletes and their sports federation.27 As such, the CAS award was binding
upon Ms. Raguz.
The Perez and Miranda cases revolved around Article 46 of the
Olympic Charter. Under this provision the Cuban Olympic Committee
("COC") attempted to exclude both Perez and Miranda from competition.
Accordingly, the disputes were brought before CAS.
In the first case of the Perez trilogy, Perez appeared as a witness but was
not served as an affected party. This case was decided against the United
States Olympic Committee ("USOC"), who had appeared on behalf of
Perez. However, because Perez had not been named as a party to the
arbitration, he was allowed to apply to the court and have his case heard on
the merits. This resulted in Perez #2, which addressed many of the issues
presented in Perez #1 and raised the question of res judicata.28 Ultimately,
the court ruled in favor of Perez. It should be noted, however, that had Perez
been served as a party to Perez #1 the court might never have heard the case
on its merits in Perez #2.29 As it stood, Perez was not an affected party in the
Perez #1 case, where the only parties were the USOC and the International
Olympic Committee ("IOC"). In contrast, the COC had been served as an
affected third party but declined to attend Perez #1 and Perez #2.
Eventually, the COC recanted its decision not to attend the previous two
hearings and brought the issue of Article 46 of the Olympic Charter back to
a differently constituted Panel of the AHD. In the final decision of the Perez
trilogy, the Panel held that the COC was estopped from disputing that it was
a party to Perez #2."
The Miranda decisions addressed issues similar to those found in the
Perez trilogy. Miranda #1 was brought before the court by the Cuban-Born
Canadian diver, Miranda, and the case was decided against him. However,
after the CAS ruling in Perez #2, the Canadian Olympic Association

27. Raguz, 2000 NSWCA 290.
28. Under the principles of res judicata, a matter that has been previously determined shall not be
heard again.
29. This was precisely the stance that the AHD took in Perez #3.
30. Perez #3, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 009 at 28. The panel held
that the Cuban NOC had been aware of the hearing, and indeed had made written representations to
the panel. In any event, the panel determined that a complaint questioning whether the COC had
been given the opportunity to be heard should have been directed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal and
not to the CAS.

("COA") raised a subsequent application that became Miranda #2. The
facts between Miranda and Perez were sufficiently different that the AHD
found against the COA.
The variety of applications brought before the AHD by these cases
concentrated on Article 46 of the Olympic Charter and raised issues about
the principle of res judicata and estoppel. In this regard, these decisions
suggest that the court will entertain an application by a party even when the
application addresses issues it has already heard. However, as demonstrated
in Perez #3, so long as an interested party has received notice and had an
opportunity to participate in the arbitration proceedings, the court's award
will be binding upon that party, and they will be estopped from bringing a
further application.
The extent to which a CAS award binds an affected third party strikes at
the very heart of the contractual underpinnings of CAS arbitration.
Although the court addressed the matter on an ad hoc basis, it will require
further refinement of the Code and the related specific Games rules to
address the problem more completely. In the meantime, the practice of CAS
and its jurisprudence, supported by the New South Wales Court of Appeal,
will remain the benchmarks in resolving the affected third party issue."
C. Jurisdictionof the panel
Article 1 of the CAS Arbitration Rules for the Games of the XXVII
Olympiad in Sydney ("the Olympic Rules")" provided for disputes arising in
Australia between September 5 and October 1, 2000, (which are covered by
Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter and by the arbitration clause inserted into
the entry form for the Olympic Games)3 to be resolved by the CAS AHD in
Sydney. The AHD also has jurisdiction over the IFs at the Games by
consideration of CAS arbitration clauses in their bylaws or regulations.
However, the notable exception is the IAAF, which was, rather ironically,
involved with three of the fifteen cases34 before the AHD in Sydney.
31. This is a point that The Law Commission for England and Wales, Working for Better Law,
addresses in Part XIV of their report at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc242/part14.htm#paral4.14, at 14.15, 14.16. The Commission notes the problem of binding third parties to
arbitration awards when they have not agreed to be so bound. Id. The Commission entertains the
idea that "an arbitration agreement ... could operate as a procedural benefit to [a] third party and
could also constitute a procedural condition on the third parties right to enforce the substantive
promise." However, the Commission ultimately put aside this possibility, noting the difficulties
arising out of the contractual nature of arbitration agreements. Id.
32. These rules are issued in connection with the Games to augment the Code and are
promulgated by ICAS pursuant to powers conferred in Article S6.8 of the Code. OG Rules,
availableat http://www.tas-cas.org.
33. Beloff, supra note 11, for the precise content and discussion of the arbitration clause.
34. Baumann v. 10C, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 6, award of Sept.
22, 2000; Segura v. IAAF, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 013, award of
Sept. 30, 2000; Melinte v. IAAF, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 15, award
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The IAAF Arbitration Panel is an internal sport tribunal, with its
jurisdiction directed only at disputes inside the IAAF, including
determinations of the Games' rules by member federations and their
application to athletes. The jurisdiction of the IAAF Arbitration Panel came
into conflict with that of the CAS AHD at the Sydney Games.
Dieter Baumann is a German middle-distance runner and was the
Olympic 5000 meter champion in 1992 at Barcelona. He was cleared of an
alleged doping infraction by his IAAF member federation the German
Athletic Federation ("DLV"). He was, therefore, properly accredited for
participation in the Sydney Games by the IOC. The IAAF believed that the
DLV had made an erroneous decision related to doping control, and brought
the case before its Arbitration Panel sitting in Sydney." On September 18,
2000, the Panel found that a doping infraction occurred and applied the
sanction of a two-year ineligibility to Baumann pursuant to Rule 60.2 of the
IAAF Rules, thereby overruling the national decision. At the request of the
IAAF, the IOC removed the athlete's accreditation. Baumann, who had not
been a party to the IAAF arbitration, brought an appeal to the AHD, which
had jurisdiction over the athlete by virtue of the Games entry form. The
IAAF raised a preliminary objection, disputing the jurisdiction of CAS
based on the absence of a CAS arbitration clause in its constitution and
because its own panel had just made a final and binding determination.
The CAS AHD dismissed the objection and retained jurisdiction over
the accreditation decision. Both the IOCand the IAAF, being members of
the Olympic movement, were deemed by the panel to have subscribed to the
arbitration clause in the Olympic Charter under Article 74. Upon hearing
the decision, the IAAF proceeded to withdraw from the proceedings and
walked out of the hearing room.
The AHD, having established jurisdiction over the involved parties,
addressed a preliminary claim that this case could not be heard because it
would be contrary to the principle of res judicata. The panel dismissed this
contention, noting that neither Baumann nor the IOC had been a party to the
IAAF arbitration and that the issues in dispute had been expanded.
Therefore, the AHD was able to examine the merits of Bauman's case.
Despite reaching this determination, the court did not interfere with the
IAAF's previous decision once it was satisfied that the IAAF Arbitration
Panel had dealt with all the evidence. The AHD effectively operated as an

of Sept. 29, 2000.
35. The jurisdiction to so act arises out of Rule 21.3(ii) and 59.2 of the IAAF Constitution.
Tarasti, supra note 6, at 171 and Bevilacqua 25/11/96, IAAF v. Federazione Italiana di Atletica
Leggera FIDAL at 143.

appeals court over the IAAF. It held the removal of Baumann's
accreditation valid and consequently the athlete was no longer able to
compete in the Games. 6

The AHD relied upon the decision in Baumann in resolving a dispute
brought before the court by Melinte. Ms. Melinte was the world record
holder in the Women's Hammer Throw and was accredited by the IOC to
compete in the Games upon her arrival in Sydney. However, Melinte had
tested positive for nandrolone on June 7, 2000. On September 17, while she
was at the games, the IAAF requested an explanation of the result from the
Romanian Athletic Federation.
Thereafter, the IAAF provisionally
suspended Melinte and removed her from competition the morning she was
to compete. The IAAF had exercised its ability to suspend following the A
sample positive.37
The case raised many of the issues addressed in the Baumann case, and
the AHD relied upon its previous determinations in support of their
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Although the IAAF still refused to be
recognized as a party to the dispute, it nonetheless agreed to participate in
the hearing by answering questions, unlike the scenario in Baumann. The
AHD rejected an attempt to distinguish the jurisdictional issues in this
dispute from those in Baumann on the grounds that the IOC did not revoke
Melinte's accreditation. It dismissed the claim, indicating that the athlete
had been removed from the field of play in Stadium Australia, which
constituted a dispute arising during the Games within the meaning of Article
74 of the Olympic Charter. The primary issue raised by Melinte was that
she had been denied due process. The court concluded that the information
put before the AHD by Melinte would have been the same information
provided to the IAAF. Ultimately, the applicant's submissions did not
persuade the Panel, and it dismissed the application. However, the court
noted that its decision was not to be viewed as a determination of whether
Melinte had in fact'committed a doping offense. Rather, the decision only
denied the applicant emergency relief with respect to her participation in the
Games. Accordingly, the IAAF procedures would have to be followed, first
within the member's process and perhaps subsequently before the IAAF
Arbitration Panel.38
The AHD preserved the jurisdiction of the IAAF Arbitration Panel
while finding that it had jurisdiction to determine the issue of emergency
relief. Essentially, the autonomy of each arbitration body remained. The
36. First Class Verdict of Guilt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 23, 2000; It Is Not Over,
It Just Started, Saarbrucker Zeitung, Sept. 23, 2000 [hereinafter German Paper].
37. Rule 59.2 IAAF Rules and Regulations (allowing for the suspension of an athlete where the
IAAF believes that a National Federation failed to impose the proper suspension before the case has
been resolved at the national level as seen in Baumann).
38. Rule 59.2 IAAF Rules and Regulations (granting the IAAF power to put a case before its
own arbitration panel when it disagrees with a National Federation decision).
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AHD asserted its control over the dispute arising in connection with the
Games, although the Panel ultimately found no grounds to intervene to grant
the athlete's request.
The final case dealing with the jurisdiction of the AHD and the IAAF
involved Segura, the Mexican race walker in the twenty kilometer event.
The case involved the application of the Games' rules with respect to
infractions leading to a disqualification. Some fifteen minutes after Segura
apparently won the race and while he was being congratulated on a mobile
phone by the President of Mexico, he was disqualified for committing
infractions during the course of the event. This time, the IAAF was a full
participant before the AHD and argued its case.
The AHD held that the relevant IAAF rules do not provide that
disqualifications are invalid if they are not communicated immediately.
Accordingly, the AHD rejected Segura's argument that the way IAAF
officials had dealt with the consequences of the three warnings violated his
rights.
Overall, the IAAF appeared to come full circle in recognizing the
jurisdiction of the AHD. They went from a refusal to participate on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and a decision having already been made, to
remaining as an observer and finally to submitting to the jurisdiction and
arguing their case. The change of attitude apparently arose from the way the
CAS had dealt with the two previous IAAF cases and the praise it received
in the German newspapers.39
D. The InquisitorialPrinciple
The Code at R44.2 and Article 15(b) of the Olympic Rules grant
arbitrators extensive power and discretion to organize the procedure in a
hearing. There was also a similar discretion in relation to evidence as found
in Article 15(d). Thus, there was a mixture of styles in conducting the
hearings. Some were conducted on the inquisitorial principle, others more
on the common law approach of formal oral evidence and submissions."0
The result has been that the AHD has preserved a wide range of powers to
study each case and clarify the material truth. The process is a curious
mixture of the civil law approach through the use of the inquisitorial
principle, and the common law approach of examination and crossexamination. The clash of these two methods in conducting the hearing

39. German Paper, supra note 36.
40. Beloff, supra note 11,at n.37 (discussing pro bono services of Australian barristers).

process is most evident in doping cases, particularly in the Raducan" doping
case that arose at the Games.
E. The Impact of the National Court Decisions on the
InternationalArbitration Panel

National court decisions frequently interact with international arbitration
proceedings. Two cases at the Sydney Games illustrate how national court
orders become part of international sports arbitration proceedings and the
effect that such orders have on parties to the arbitration.
The first of these cases addressed the effect of a national court order on
an IF. The International Weightlifting Federation ("IWF") adopted a
suspension issued by the Samoan Weightlifting Federation ("SWF") that
precluded Samoan weightlifter Ofisa Jr. Ofisa from participating in the
Olympic Games." The athlete obtained a Samoan interim court order
precluding enforcement of the suspension imposed by the SWF. The CAS
acknowledged that the court order clearly affected the SWF and
consequently removed its ability to impose a suspension on the athlete. The
AHD held that the Samoan court order was not binding on the IWF. The
keystone to the IWF's suspension was the SWF's decision. Therefore, the
Samoan court order removed the foundation of the IWF's suspension, and as
a result, the IWF's decision became invalid. Accordingly, the CAS set aside
the IWF suspension.
The second CAS case involved two seventy-six kilogram Greco-Roman
wrestlers representing the United States, Matt Lindland and Keith Sieracki."
In the United States, Lindland protested the results of an amateur wrestling
match that determined the U.S. Olympic Team selection. Arbitration of the
dispute led to an award providing for the bout to be re-wrestled. Lindland
won the re-match, but the USOC did not nominate him to the team.
Lindland then appealed to the Seventh Circuit," where the arbitration award
was enforced and the USOC nominated Lindland to the U.S. Olympic Team.
While Lindland was bringing his case before the Seventh Circuit, Sieracki
attempted to have the results of the re-bout nullified through further
arbitration proceedings. However, the Seventh Circuit's order ended
Sieracki's attempt to win the dispute at the domestic level. As a final
recourse, Sieracki raised an appeal to the CAS following the IOC's removal

41. Raducan v. IOC, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 011, award of Sept.
28, 2000. This decision was appealed to the Swiss Federal Court and later dismissed. Swiss
Tribunal, No. 5P.427/2000 (Dec. 4, 2000).
42. Samoa NOC v. IWF, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 002, award of
Sept. 12, 2000. The suspension was based upon alleged sexual misconduct with a minor at the
Oceania Weightlifting Championships. Id.
43. Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass'n, 230 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2000).
44. Id. at 1037.
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of his accreditation.4 ' The proceedings came to an abrupt halt when, on the
application of Matt Lindland, the U.S. District Court in the Northern District
of Illinois issued an order restraining Sieracki from pursuing the proceedings
before the AHD on pain of contempt of court proceedings.
As a
consequence, Sieracki withdrew his application, and the AHD terminated the
proceedings.
These cases show that national court orders have no binding effect upon
non-national parties but are binding upon parties within the jurisdiction of
the national court. Thus, the order of the Samoa court, although not binding
on the IWF or upon the CAS, had the effect of invalidating an international
body's suspension. Similarly, the U.S. Court order had no effect on the
jurisdiction of the AHD to hear Sieracki's application but prohibited
Sieracki himself from seeking any such relief.
F. The Relation of CAS Decisions to NationalLaw
The preceding section illustrates the extent to which national court
orders can affect international arbitrations. However, how do international
arbitration proceedings impact upon domestic courts? Two cases arising out
of CAS decisions address this issue.
In the Raguz case 6 discussed above, the NSW Court of Appeal
confirmed the substantial autonomy of CAS and the extent to which it could
review a CAS decision. 7 Referring to the interlocking agreements among
the Australian Olympic Committee, the Judo Federation of Australia, the
athlete, and the Swiss Seat of Arbitration, the NSW Court declared that it
did not have jurisdiction to review a question of law arising out of the CAS
decision. Specifically, the NSW Court's jurisdiction was precluded by the
existence of an exclusion agreement that was permitted under the Australian
Commercial Arbitration Act of 1984.
Similarly, the CAS decision in respect to Andreea Raducan 8 at the
Games resulted in proceedings before the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 9 In the
Raducan appeal, the Swiss Tribunal held that factual issues about the
quantity of urine supplied did not infringe the applicant's right to be heard
because the Panel restricted its answers to the factual issues. It was
determined that this issue could not be reasonably considered as having any
45. Sierocki v. 10C, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G.Sydney 2000) 007, award of Sept.
21, 2000.
46. Raguz, 2000 NSWCA 290.
47. Id.
48. Raducan, Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000) 011.
49. Ddcan, 5P. 427/2000 (Dec. 4, 2000).

impact on the analysis of the AHD panel. It was also found that there was
no unequal treatment inconsistent with the public order, which was another
ground of appeal. Therefore, the Swiss Court refused to interfere in the
findings or result of the AHD and would not declare a breach of the Olympic
Movement Anti-Doping Code for failure to have obtained the required
seventy-five milliliter minimum quantity of urine.
Together, these two cases stand for the proposition that CAS awards
will be final, binding, and offer very narrow grounds for review.
Enforcement of the award will be carried out in accordance with the decision
of the CAS. The Swiss Federal Court, through the reciprocal enforcement of
international arbitration awards through the 1958 New York Convention,
will result in the enforceability of the final and binding decision of CAS in
the event that a party will not comply.
III. CONCLUSION

CAS is emerging as a competent, independent, and accomplished sport
adjudicating body, just as its founders had hoped. In so doing, it is required
to address many of the same issues found in the more broadly based law of
international arbitrations generally. Its jurisprudence on those matters
reflects the competency with which it undertakes its tasks.

